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Abstract
The (generalized) Gini indices rely on the social welfare function of a decision maker
who behaves in accordance with Yaari’s model, with a function f that transforms
frequencies. This SWF can also be represented as the weighted sum of the welfare of
all the possible coalitions in the society, where the welfare of a coalition is defined as
the income of the worst-off member of that coalition. We provide a set of axioms (Ak)
and prove that the three following statements are equivalent: (i) the decision maker
respects (Ak), (ii) f is a polynomial of degree k, (iii) the weight of all coalitions with
more than k members is equal to zero. Journal of Economic Literature Classification
Number: D63
1 Introduction
During the last twenty years, a large literature has been devoted to various generalization
of the Gini index (see e.g. Donaldson and Weymark (1980), Weymark (1981), Yaari (1987),
Ebert (1988), Chakravarty (1988), Bossert (1990)). Although these works help to under-
stand the normative basis of the Gini indices, it may be difficult to choose a specific index
among the wide class of generalized Gini indices. The aim of this paper is to provide a
normative benchmark for such a choice.
The Gini index and its generalizations are known to rely on non-additive expected
utility functionals, and more precisely on Choquet integrals with respect to some non-
additive measures1 (see e.g. Yaari (1988), Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994), Grabisch (1998)).
∗Financial support from the European Community (TMR Program) and the hospitality of Tel Aviv
University where part of this work has been done, are gratefully acknowledged. I thank Eddie Dekel and
Itzhak Gilboa for insightful discussions and comments.
†THEMA - Universite´ de Cergy-Pontoise and EUREQua - Universite´ Paris I, 106-112 bd de l’Hoˆpital,
75647 Paris Cedex 13. gajdos@univ-paris1.fr
1There exists a large literature devoted to the axiomatization of (generalized) Gini indices (see e.g. Yaari
(1988), Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994), Ebert (1988), Weymark (1981), Blackorby and Donaldson (1978),
Donaldson and Weymark (1980)).
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As pointed out by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994), these non-additive functionals admit a
“canonical representation”, that has a nice interpretation in the context of social choice.
Let the society be described as the set of all the possible coalitions in that society. Define
the utility level of a coalition as the utility level of its worst-off member. Then, the Choquet
integral may be written as a linear combination of these coalitional utility levels.
But, actually, the Gini index and its generalizations are related to a rather particular
case of Choquet integrals: the non-additive measures used here are symmetric. Which
means that one can write the Choquet integral in a rather simple way, using a frequency
distortion function. This paper focuses on the link between the canonical representation
of a Choquet integral with respect to a symmetric non-additive measure, the distortion
function and the Gini index that relies on this Choquet integral.
More specifically, we prove a result suggested by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995), namely
that the weight of all coalitions with more than k members is equal to zero if and only
if the distortion function is a polynomial of degree (at most) k. Now, assume that a
decision maker behaves in accordance with Yaari’s dual model (so the inequality index that
rely on this decision maker’s preference is a generalized Gini index). We provide a set of
axioms (Ak) that generalize an axiom proposed by Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994), such
that the decision maker respects axiom (Ak) if and only if his frequency distortion function
is a polynomial of degree (at most) k. We call P -Gini the generalized Gini indices with a
polynomial distortion function. These indices have a very natural interpretation in terms
of the weight the decision maker puts on envy in the society. These results may provide
a normative benchmark for the choice of a specific generalized Gini index among the wide
class of all the generalized Ginis.
2 Canonical Representation, symmetric capacities and Poly-
nomial Distortion Functions
Let Ω = {1, ..., n}, with n ∈ N∗ (so, n is not fixed), Σ = 2Ω and Σ′ = Σ \ {∅}. We consider
the space of random variables G = {g |g : Ω→ R}. A capacity is a function v : Σ→ R, with
v (∅) = 0. We consider here capacities that are monotone (i.e., A ⊆ B implies v (A) ≤ v (B)
for all A, B ∈ Σ) and normalized (i.e., v (Σ) = 1). The Choquet integral of g ∈ G with
respect to v is defined as:∫
C
gdv =
∫ +∞
0
v ({ω |g (ω) ≥ t}) dt+
∫ 0
−∞
[v ({ω |g (ω) ≥ t})− v (Ω)] dt.
This integral can be written as (see e.g. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994)):∫
C
gdv =
∑
T∈Σ′
αvT
[
min
ω∈T
g (ω)
]
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where
αvT =
∑
S⊆T
(−1)|T |−|S| v (S) .
If v is symmetric (i.e., v (T ) = v (T ′) whenever |T | = |T ′|), then there exists a strictly
increasing and continuous distortion function f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], with f (0) = 0 and f (1) = 1
such that v (T ) = f (P (T )), where P is a probability measure over (Ω,Σ). Therefore, αvT
only depends on |T | and f . Hence, if |T | = j we will note αvT as αfj . Furthermore, in that
case, we have ∫
C
gdv =
n∑
i=1
[
f
(
n− i+ 1
n
)
− f
(
n− i
n
)]
g˜ (i)
where g˜ (i) := g (pi (i)) , with pi a permutation such that g˜ (1) ≤ g˜ (2) ≤ ... ≤ g˜ (n). In other
words, with a symmetric capacity, the Choquet integral reduces to Yaari’s dual model
(1987)).
A straightforward computation shows that
αfj =
j∑
i=1
(−1)j−i
(
j
i
)
f
(
i
n
)
where (
j
i
)
=
j!
i! (j − i)! .
Let E : f
(
j
n
)
7→ f
(
j−1
n
)
and I : f
(
j
n
)
7→ f
(
j
n
)
; define: ∆kf
(
j
n
)
:= (I − E)k f
(
j
n
)
.
A direct application of the binomial formula leads to:
∆kf
(
j
n
)
=
k∑
i=0
(−1)k−i
(
k
i
)
f
(
j − k + i
n
)
.
Hence, we have
αfj = ∆
jf
(
j
n
)
.
This relation between the weights αfj and the j
th finite difference of f is the key of our
results.
We can now state the following result.
Theorem 1 For a Choquet integral with respect to a symmetric capacity, the two following
propositions are equivalent:
(i) f is a polynomial with degree (at most) equal to k
(ii) ∀j > k, αfj = 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that (i) ⇒ (ii) had been proved in a much more general framework by Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1995), in the proof of their Theorem C (they don’t require for Ω to be
countable).
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3 Measuring Inequalities without Linearity in Envy
We denote by Γ the set of rank-ordered discrete and uniform income distributions, with
values in R. An income distribution X in Γ is defined by: X =
(
x1,
1
n ; ...;xn,
1
n
)
where n
belongs to N∗, xi belongs to R for all i, xi ≤ xi+1 for all i in {1, ..., n− 1}.
Let  be the decision maker’s preference relation over Γ (as usual, we will denote
X ∼ Y if X  Y and Y  X). Assume, furthermore, that the decision maker evaluates
the income distribution through a Choquet integral. Then it makes sense to require that
the capacity with respect to which the Choquet integral is computed be symmetric. It may
be interpreted as requiring for the decision maker to be impartial. (One can then think of
the decision maker as anybody behind the veil of ignorance. Although not indisputable,
this assumption is quite standard in the field of social choice and normative inequality
measurement).
Therefore, the decision maker behaves in accordance with Yaari’s Dual model (1987).
There hence exists a strictly increasing continuous frequency distortion function f : [0, 1]→
[0, 1] with f (0) = 0 and f (1) = 1, such that  is represented by:
V (X) =
n∑
i=1
[
f
(
n− i+ 1
n
)
− f
(
n− i
n
)]
xi.
The generalized Gini index that relies on this welfare function can then be written as:
IG (X) = 1−
∑n
i=1
[
f
(
n−i+1
n
)− f (n−in )]xi
X¯
where X¯ denotes the mean of X.
Define: T 1i (ε) := (0, ..., 0,−ε, 0, ...0) ∈ Γ, where the (−ε) term occurs in ith position,
and T k+1i (ε) := T
k
i (ε)− T ki−1 (ε). The following table describes the first values of T ki (ε).
i− l + 1 · · · i− j · · · i− 4 i− 3 i− 2 i− 1 i
k = 1 −ε
k = 2 ε −ε
k = 3 −ε 2ε −ε
k = 4 ε −3ε 3ε −ε
k = 5 −ε 4ε −6ε 4ε −ε
...
k = r (−1)r ε · · · (−1)j+1 (r−1j )ε · · · · · · · · · · · · rε −ε
Consider the following set of axioms:
Axiom (Ak)
∀X ∈ Γ, X + T ki (ε) ∼ X + T kj (ε)
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for all i, j, and ε such that T ki (ε) and T
k
j (ε) are well defined andX+T
k
i (ε) andX+T
k
j (ε) ∈
Γ.
These axioms may be understood as follows. First, one can interpret T ki (ε) as a taxation
scheme. With this interpretation, T 1i (ε) consists in making individual i pay ε (without any
transfer): one obtains X + T 1i (ε) (let X ∈ Γ, so xi ≤ xi+1). Admittedly, a decision maker
will consider that such a policy has a negative impact on welfare. The next question we
can ask is: Does the size of this negative impact depend on the location where this policy
is applied, i.e., the rank of the individual who has to pay ε? If not, the decision maker
respects (A1). But this implies that the decision maker is not concerned at all by equality:
making the poorest one or the richest one paying ε is, from his point of view, equivalent.
Now, assume that the decision maker thinks – which seems reasonable if he cares about
inequality – that it is better to apply this policy to individual i rather than to individual
(i− 1). We then have
(x1, ..., xi−1, xi − ε, xi+1, ..., xn)  (x1, ..., xi−1 − ε, xi, xi+1, ..., xn)
which for ε small enough (i.e., such that xi−1 + ε ≤ xi − ε) implies, by the independence
axiom:
(x1, ..., xi−1 + ε, xi − ε, xi+1, ..., xn)  (x1, ..., xi−1, xi, xi+1, ..., xn)
that is : X + T 2i (ε)  X. In other words, it implies that the decision maker considers
the policy T 2i (ε) (which is known as a Pigou-Dalton transfer) as a welfare improving one.
He is inequality averse in the very standard sense: any Pigou-Dalton transfer increases his
measure of welfare. But then, we can go further and ask whether the size of the increase of
welfare implied by this policy depends on the location in the income distribution where this
policy is applied. If the answer is no, the decision maker respects axiom (A2). Assume, on
the other hand, that the location where this policy is applied is relevant. In particular, if
the decision maker is quite sensitive to inequalities, it may be the case that the lower this
policy is applied, the better it is – from the decision maker’s point of view – (this is the
“rank dependent” version of the principle of diminishing transfer: see e.g. Mehran (1976),
Kakwani (1980), Chateauneuf and Wilthien (1999), Zoli (1999)). In this case we have
(x1, ..., xi−2 + ε, xi−1 − ε, xi, xi+1, ..., xn)  (x1, ..., xi−2, xi−1 + ε, xi − ε, xi+1, ..., xn)
which implies for ε small enough:
(x1, ..., xi−2 − ε, xi−1 + 2ε, xi − ε, xi+1, ..., xn)  (x1, ..., xi−2, xi−1, xi, xi+1, ..., xn)
that is X +T 3i (ε)  X. Therefore, the decision maker believes that the policy T 3i (ε) has a
negative impact on welfare. Does the size of this impact depend on the location where this
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policy is applied? If not, the decision maker respects axiom (A3). If it does, then one can
think that the lower this policy is applied, the higher is the cost in terms of welfare. Which
in turn implies that the decision maker consider the policy T 4i (ε) as a favorable one, and
so on.
Some remarks may be in order. First, note that A (k − 1) implies Ak. Second, for any
k ∈ N, axiom (Ak) is equivalent to the following one:
Axiom (Ak∗)
∀X,Y ∈ Γ, X  Y ⇐⇒ X + T ki (ε)  Y + T kj (ε)
for all i, j, and ε such that T ki (ε) and T
k
j (ε) are well defined and X + T
k
i (ε), Y + T
k
j (ε),
X + T kj (ε), Y + T
k
i (ε) ∈ Γ.
Indeed, it is obvious that (Ak∗) implies (Ak) (simply let X = Y in (Ak∗)). Assume that
(Ak) is satisfied. Then, for any X and Y in Γ and i, j, ε such that X + T ki (ε), X + T
k
j (ε),
Y + T ki (ε) and Y + T
k
j (ε) belong to Γ,{
X + T ki (ε) ∼ X + T kj (ε)
Y + T ki (ε) ∼ Y + T kj (ε)
If X  Y , this implies X+T ki (ε)  Y +T ki (ε) by the independence axiom (X, Y , X+T ki (ε)
and Y +T ki (ε) are clearly comontone). Therefore, by transitivity, X+T
k
i (ε)  Y +T kj (ε).
Note that (A2∗) is what Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994) called “Axiom A6 on F”: It is
the key axiom in their characterization of the Gini index.
We have the following result.
Theorem 2 For a decision maker who behaves in accordance with Yaari’s dual model,
with f Ck+1 on [0, 1], the two following propositions are equivalent:
(i) f is a polynomial of degree (at most) k.
(ii) the decision maker respects axiom (Ak).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Now, we define the P−Gini indices as follows: a generalized Gini index IG is a P−Gini
index if f is a polynomial. Theorems 1 and 2 imply readily the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Assume that the decision maker behaves in accordance with Yaari’s dual
model with f Ck+1 on [0, 1]. Then the two following propositions are equivalent:
(i) the decision maker respects axiom (Ak)
(ii) the decision maker only takes into account the welfare of coalitions with less than
(k + 1) agents.
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Hence, we obtain a nice interpretation of P -Gini indices. If the decision maker respects
axiom (A1), we obtain an utilitarian welfare function, where only individuals’ incomes are
taken into account. If the decision maker respects (A2) and not (A1), he also considers
the welfare of pairs: We then obtain the classical Gini index. As pointed out by Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1994), this may be interpreted as envy-aversion. Indeed, according to
the canonical representation, the welfare of the pair {i, j} is equal to min {xi, xj}. Then,
the coefficient αf2 can be interpreted as the relative weight put by the decision maker on
i’s envy in j (assuming, say, that xi < xj). But, as noted by Gilboa and Schmeidler, if
αfj = 0 for all j > 2, the welfare function is, in one sense, linear in envy. Let us consider
the example provided by these authors. Let X = (0, 1, 1). If αfj = 0 for all j > 2 (i.e.,
the decision maker respects (A2)), individual 1’s envy in 2 and 3 is simply described by
αf2 [inf {0, 1}] + αf2 [inf {0, 1}]. But, as Gilboa and Schmeidler put it: “More generally, one
may suspect that individual 1 (...) will feel even ‘greater’ envy that this ‘sum’. After all,
s/he may justly claim that ‘Everyone is better off than I am’ ”. Now, assume that αf3 > 0
(hence, the decision maker doesn’t respect A2). Then, individual 1’s envy in 2 and 3 is
described by αf2 [inf {0, 1}] + αf2 [inf {0, 1}] + αf3 [inf {0, 1, 1}]. The welfare functional is no
more linear in envy.
Appendix
We will need the following lemma.
Lemma Let f : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] be (k + 1) times continuously differentiable on [0, 1]. Then f
is a polynomial of degree (at most) k if and only if:
∃t ∈ N, ∀i, n ∈ N, t ≤ i ≤ n, n > 0, ∆k+1f
(
i
n
)
= 0 (1)
Proof.
The “only if” part of the lemma is trivial. Let us prove the “if” part. Let n = rm and
i = qm, with r, q and m arbitrarily chosen in N such that t ≤ i ≤ n and n > 0. We have
(see e.g. Cartan (1967), Proposition 7.2.1, p. 92):∥∥∥∥∥∆k+1f
(
i
n
)
−
(
1
n
)k+1
f (k+1)
(
i
n
)∥∥∥∥∥ = o
((
1
n
)k+1)
.
Therefore (1) implies:
lim
m→∞ (rm)
k+1∆k+1
(qm
rm
)
= lim
m→∞ (rm)
k+1
(
1
rm
)k+1
f (k+1)
(qm
rm
)
= f (k+1)
(
i
n
)
.
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It follows that f (k+1) (p) = 0 for all p ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q; by density of [0, 1] ∩ Q in [0, 1] and
continuity of f (k+1), this implies f (k+1) (x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1], the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 1
(i)⇒ (ii)
If f is a polynomial with degree (at most) k, ∆jf
(
i
n
)
= 0 for any j = k + 1, k + 2, ...,
and i = j, ..., n. So, in particular, ∆jf
(
j
n
)
= 0 for any j = k + 1, k + 2,..., n. Therefore,
αfj = ∆
jf
(
j
n
)
= 0, ∀j = k + 1, k + 2,..., n
(ii)⇒ (i)
Assume that for any j > k, αfj = 0. This implies that for any j > k, ∆
jf
(
j
n
)
= 0. But
we have, for fixed k, and for any i ≥ 0, l = 0, ..., n:
∆k+i+1f
(
l
n
)
= (I − E)i (I − E)k+1 f
(
l
n
)
= (I − E)k+1
 i∑
j=0
(−1)i−j
(
i
j
)
f
(
l − i+ j
n
)
=
i∑
j=0
(−1)i−j
(
i
j
)
∆k+1f
(
l − i+ j
n
)
.
So, in particular:
∆k+i+1f
(
k + i+ 1
n
)
=
i∑
j=0
(−1)i−j
(
i
j
)
∆k+1f
(
k + 1 + j
n
)
(2)
Let P (i) : [∆k+1f (k+rn ) = 0, ∀r = 1, ..., i]. Since αfk+1 = ∆k+1f (k+1n ) = 0, P (1) is
true. Assume that P (i) is true. By (2) we have:
∆k+i+1f
(
k + i+ 1
n
)
=
i−1∑
j=0
(−1)i−j
(
i
j
)
∆k+1f
(
k + 1 + j
n
)
+∆k+1f
(
k + i+ 1
n
)
.
But ∆k+i+1f
(
k+i+1
n
)
= αvk+i+1 = 0 by assumption, and
∑i−1
j=0 (−1)i−j
(
i
j
)
∆k+1f
(
k+1+j
n
)
=
0 by P (i). Therefore, ∆k+1f (k+i+1n ) = 0; hence P (i) =⇒ P (i+ 1). This implies:
∆k+1f
(
j
n
)
= 0, ∀j, n ∈ N such that k < j ≤ n
which in turn entails that f is a polynomial of degree (at most) equal to k by the lemma
(obviously, the degree of f is exactly k if αfk 6= 0). 
Proof of Theorem 2
(i)⇒ (ii)
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Define F : T ki (ε) 7→ T ki−1 (ε) and J : T ki (ε) 7→ T ki (ε). We have: T ki (ε) = (J − F )k−1 T 1i (ε).
Therefore:
T ki (ε) =
k−1∑
l=0
(−1)k−1−l
(
k − 1
l
)
T 1i−k+1+l (ε) .
Let j = k − 1− l. We then get:
T ki (ε) =
k−1∑
l=0
(−1)j
(
k − 1
k − 1− j
)
T 1i−j (ε) =
k−1∑
l=0
(−1)j
(
k − 1
j
)
T 1i−j (ε)
since
(
k−1
k−1−j
)
=
(
k−1
j
)
.
The (i− j)th component of T ki (ε) is (−1)j
(
k−1
j
)
(−ε) for j = 0, ..., k−1 and 0 otherwise.
We hence have:
V
(
X + T ki (ε)
)
− V (X) =
k−1∑
j=0
[
f
(
n− i+ j + 1
n
)
− f
(
n− i+ j
n
)]
(−1)j
(
k − 1
j
)
(−ε)
= (−1)k ε
k−1∑
j=0
[
f
(
n− i+ j + 1
n
)
− f
(
n− i+ j
n
)]
(−1)k−1−j
(
k − 1
j
)
(the last equality holds because (2k − 1− j) is even if and only if (j + 1) is even). Hence:
V
(
X + T ki (ε)
)
− V (X) = (−1)k ε∆kf
(
n− i+ k
n
)
Assume that f is a polynomial of degree k. Then ∆kf
(
n−i+k
n
)
is constant when i varies
from k to n. Hence, V
(
X + T ki (ε)
)− V (X) doesn’t depend on i. Therefore:
∀X ∈ Γ, V
(
X + T ki (ε)
)
− V (X) = V
(
X + T kj (ε)
)
− V (X) , ∀i, j ∈ {k, ..., n}
which implies (ii).
(ii)⇒ (i)
Assume we have (ii):
∀X ∈ Γ, X + T ki (ε) ∼ X + T kj (ε)
for all i, j and ε such that X+T ki (ε) and X+T
k
j (ε) belong to Γ. Hence, V
(
X + T ki (ε)
)−
V (X) doesn’t depend on i, which implies:
(−1)k ε∆kf
(
n− i+ k
n
)
= (−1)k ε∆kf
(
n− j + k
n
)
for all i 6= j ∈ {k, ..., n}
Therefore, ∆k+1f
(
n−i+k
n
)
= 0 for all i and n in N such that n ≥ i ≥ k, which implies that
f is a polynomial of degree (at most) k by the lemma. (The degree of f is exactly k if the
decision maker respects (Ak) but not (A (k − 1)). 
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